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WHEN IS A TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY INTEREST IN
COMMON lAW JURISDICTIONS AN ASSET OF ONE
SPOUSE?: CRAFT-ING A SOLUTION FOR THE TAX
CODE'S § 108 INSOLVENCY EXCLUSION
Kimberly A. Butlakt
I.

INTRODUCTION

Gross income for purposes of federal income tax consists of income
from all sources derived, including income from discharge of indebtedness. 1 Discharge of indebtedness is considered income because a
debt does not have to be repaid once it is discharged, even though the
debtor received the beneficial use of the funds. 2 Over time courts
have held that a debtor has no taxable income from the discharged
debt. 3 This practice-recognizing that an insolvent debtor whose
debt is discharged receives nothing of exchangeable value-became
known as the judicial insolvency exception. 4 When determining insolvency under this exception, courts disregarded proFerty that was protected under state law from creditors' claims because the creditor
discharging the debt could not seize it; therefore, this property was
not considered an asset of the debtor. 5
In the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 ("BTA 1980"), Congress codified
the judicial insolvency exception in § 108 of the Internal Revenue
Code ("Code").6 Section 108, now the exclusive insolvency excep-

t
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

6.

Associate, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP; LL.M. (Taxation), Georgetown
University Law Center (2002); J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law
(2001).
LR.C. § 61(a)(12) (West 2004); see al50 Gitlitz v. Comm'r, 531 U.S. 206, 213
(2001). Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. LR.C. §§ 1-9833 (West 2004).
United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931). The rule of Kirby
Lumber, in which the Supreme Court held that a debtor realized "an accession to income" where "assets previously offset by the obligation ... now
extinct" became available, is codified in LR.C. § 61(a)(12). See id.; see also
infra Part ILA (discussing the inclusion of discharged debt in taxable
income).
See, e.g., Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Comm'r, 70 F.2d 95,
96 (5th Cir. 1934).
See infra Part ILB (discussing the judicial insolvency exception).
See Cole v. Comm'r, 42 B.TA. 1110, 1113 (1940). Insolvency results when
the debtor's liabilities exceed his assets. LR.C. § 108(d)(3) (West 2004).
See also infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text (discussing Dallas Transfer);
infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing Cole and its progeny).
Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 [hereinafter BTA 1980], Pub. L. No. 96-589,
§ 2, 94 Stat. 3389 (1980); see also S. REp. No. 96-1035, at 7-8 nn.1, 2 (1980),

287

288

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 34

tion/ allows a debtor to exclude a discharged debt from income if his
or her liabilities exceed the fair market value of his or her assets. 8 It
was not until a few years ago, however, that a court considered
whether property protected by state law from creditors' claims is considered an asset under § 108, or whether it is disregarded-as it had
been under the judicial insolvency exception.
In 2001, the United States Tax Court considered this issue in Carlson v. Commissioner. 9 The court concluded that unlike the judicial insolvency exception, property protected under state law from creditors'
claims was not disregarded when determining insolvency under § 108.10
In light of Carlson, a question remains as to what type of propertywhich, until then, had been disregarded-is considered an asset
under § 108. In particular, a question arises as to whether property
titled as tenants by the entirety is considered an asset when determining a debtor-spouse's insolvency.
In 2002, the Supreme Court took a step toward answering this question in United States v. Craft. I I Although Craft did not involve a
debtor's insolvency, the opinion is instructive because the Court exhaustively analyzed the indicia of ownership of a tenancy by the entirety interest. 12 The issue in Craft was whether a federal tax lien could
attach to one spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest. I3 In considering the issue, the Court looked at the actual rights (and not merely
state law labels) the debtor-spouse had in his tenancy by the entirety
interest, and determined that he had property or rights to property.I4
More specifically, the Court held that, despite the protections afforded under state law, a debtor-spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest constituted property or a right to property upon which a federal
tax lien could attach, although the tax was owed by only one spouse. I5

7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. 7017; infra Part II.C (discussing the codification of the judicial insolvency exclusion).
I.R.C. § 108(e) (1).
I.R.C. § 108(a)(I)(B), (d) (3). This article focuses on the issues of which
property is considered an asset of a taxpayer and what the asset's associated
value is for purposes of the § 108 insolvency calculation. The issue of what
is a liability under § 108 was addressed by the United States Tax Court in
Merkel v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 463 (1997). The court held that in order for a
contingent debt obligation to be a liability under § 108, the taxpayers must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they would be called upon
to pay the obligation in an amount less than their full exposure. Id. at 47576.
116 T.C. 87 (2001).
Id. at 105-06; see also infra Part III (discussing Carlson).
535 U.S. 274 (2002).
See infra Part IV (discussing Craft).
Craft, 535 U.S. at 276.
See id. at 283-88.
Id. at 288.
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The Court, however, remanded the issue of valuation of the debtorspouse's tenancy by the entirety interest. 16
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Craft and the Tax
Court's holding in Carlson, a cogent argument can be made that a
tenancy by the entirety interest is considered an asset under § lOS
when a debt of only one spouse is discharged. This situation is illustrated by the following example.
Assume Paul and Mary are husband and wife who own their house
as tenants by the entirety in a traditional common law jurisdiction,
such as Maryland. 17 Paul, alone, takes out a $100,000 loan for his business. The business subsequently fails and the full amount of the loan
is discharged. This discharged debt is income, as it is an accession to
wealth. If, immediately before Paul's debt is discharged, he has liabilities of $250,000 and assets with a fair market value of $360,000 (including the value of the house), then he is solvent to the extent of
$110,000. Accordingly, the entire discharged debt is includible in
Paul's income. Should the house he owns with Mary as tenants by the
entirety be considered an asset, although the debt discharged was not
marital debt and despite the protections afforded to tenancy by the
entirety property under state law? If so, what should be the value of
Paul's interest in the house?
To analyze this issue, this article first sets forth the origin and development of the judicial insolvency exception and the codification of
the exception in § 10S.18 Second, this article reviews the Tax Court's
analysis in Carlson of exempt property as enhancing a debtor's ability
to pay.19 Third, this article discusses the Supreme Court's rationale
for holding that a federal tax lien can attach to a tenancy by the entirety interest although only one spouse owes the tax, and despite the
state law ownership restrictions (and resulting protections) associated
with tenancy by the entirety property.20 Fourth, this article analyzes
the rights and restrictions of a tenancy by the entirety interest in a
traditional common law jurisdiction such as Maryland. 21 Based on the
discussion of the foregoing, the article concludes that a tenancy by the
entirety interest should be considered an asset under § lOS. 22
The focus of this article then shifts to address the conundrum of
determining the fair market value of a present interest in one spouse's
tenancy by the entirety interest. This article reviews how courts have
valued one spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest post-CraJf3 and
16. See id. at 289.
17. This example will be used passim to illustrate the concepts and development of the law described in this article.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.A.
22. See infra Part V.B.
23. See infra Part Vl.B.
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how this interest is valued by the IRS in collection proceedings.24
Next, this article considers the Code's statutory formula for valuing a
tenancy by the entirety interest for estate tax purposes. 25 Then, because the value of one spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest may be
impacted as a result of divorce, this article reviews the potential effect
of marital dissolution law in an equity jurisdiction (where property is
divided based on the equities of the relationship, rather than equally),
such as Maryland. 26 This article concludes that a debtor-spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest should be valued by assigning each
spouse a value in his or her respective interest that is half of the net
asset value of the underlying property.27 The value should then be
adjusted, when appropriate, based on the facts and circumstances,
particularly those that would affect valuation in a marital dissolution
proceeding or valuation of a survivorship interest. 28
II.

GENESIS AND
EXCLUSION

DEVELOPMENT

OF

THE

INSOLVENCY

A.

United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.: Discharged Debt Included in
Income

Discharged debt was first included in gross income in United States v.
Kirby Lumber CO. 29 Kirby Lumber arose around the time of the first
Texas oil boom. 30 John Henry Kirby, a Houston pioneer, sold large
tracts of pine forest to Houston Oil Company but kept the timber and
organized the Kirby Lumber Company to cut it down. 31 The company
issued bonds at par value and later purchased some of those bonds for
less than par value. 32 The exchange resulted in a return of
$137,521.30 to the company.33 In its one-page opinion, the Court
held that this amount was an accession to wealth to the company that
must be considered when calculating gross income. 34 The Court reasoned that the company had "no shrinkage of assets and [it] made a
clear gain. As a result of its dealings it made available $137,521.30
[in] assets previously offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct."35
24. See infra Part VI.C.
25. See infra Part VI.D.
26. See infra Part VI.E.
27. See infra Part VII.
28. See infra Part VII.
29. 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
30. Deborah H. Schenk, The Story ofKirby Lumber: The Many Faces ofDischarge of
Indebtedness Income, in TAX STORIES 97 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003).
31. [d.
32. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. at 2.
33. [d.
34. See id. at 3.
35. [d.
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The rule of Kirby Lumber that discharge of indebtedness is income to
the debtor was codified in § 61 (a)(12).36
B. Judicial Insolvency Exception

Shortly after Kirby Lumber, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit created a judicial insolvency exception in Dallas
Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner. 37 As in Kirby Lumber, the debtor in Dallas Transferwas a Texas company-in this case, a
corporation engaged in the transfer and storage business. 38 The corporation owed $107,880.77 to its landlord. 39 Because the corporation
was insolvent, the landlord accepted partial payment of $17,507.20 on
the debt and canceled the rest. 40
When determining whether the discharged debt was income to the
insolvent corporation, the court compared the cancellation of the
debt to what occurs in an insolvency or bankruptcy proceeding,
whereby a debtor is discharged from liability for its debts. 41 In such a
proceeding, the debtor does not acquire something of exchangeable
value in addition to what he had before: there is a reduction or extinguishment of liabilities without any increase of assets; there is an absence of gain or profit, as required to be considered income. 42 The
court recognized that a discharged insolvent or a bankrupt individual
or entity would not have taxable income in the amount that the debts
exceed surrendered assets. 43 Similarly, a discharged debt that left a
debtor insolvent was not income. 44 The debtor has no increase in
assets as a result of the discharge and, therefore, received no gain or
profit. 45
The court concluded: "A transaction whereby nothing of exchangeable value comes to or is received by a taxpayer does not give rise to or
create taxable income."46 As a result of Dallas Transfer, an exception
to Kirby Lumber was created whereby a debtor remaining insolvent after a debt was discharged does not recognize the discharged debt as
income.
The judicial insolvency exception was refined a few years later in
Lakelcnd Grocery Co. v. Commissioner. 47 In Lakeland Grocery, the Board of
Tax Appeals extended the rationales of Kirby Lumber and Dallas TransSeel.R.C. § 61 (a)(12) (West 2004).
70 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1934).
Id. at 95.
See id. at 95-96.
See id. at 96.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
46. Id.
47. 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937).
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
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fer and held that the discharged debt was excluded from income only
to the extent of the debtor's insolvency.48 The debtor, a Florida corporation, could not pay its debts. Mter the debts were discharged, it
was solvent to the extent of $39,596.93. 49 The court recognized that a
debtor would not have taxable income from a discharged debt if the
debtor was insolvent after the discharge. 5o In this case, however, at
the time the debt was discharged, the corporation's assets exceeded its
liabilities. 51 Because the corporation was solvent, the court held that
it had taxable income to the extent that the discharged debt resulted
in its solvency. 52
Several years after its decision in Lakeland Grocery, the Board of Tax
Appeals added another layer of analysis to the judicial insolvency exception in Cole v. Commissioner. 53 Rufus Cole, the petitioner-debtor,
was a corporate executive who became heavily indebted to brokers. 54
His employer advanced $101,830 to him, and later discharged $63,000
of that amount. 55 When determining the extent to which Mr. Cole's
liabilities exceeded his assets (and thus, the extent of his insolvency),
the Board of Tax Appeals disregarded assets exempt under state law
from creditors' claims-in this case, the value of Mr. Cole's equity in
ten insurance policies. 56 Without much analysis, the board based its
decision on the fact that the policies were excluded from creditors'
claims under New York law. 57 Presumably, the board did so because
these assets were never released from the employer-creditor's reach,
as it could never attach an interest in them. For the next forty years,
assets exempt under state law from creditors' claims were disregarded
48. Id. at 292.
49. Id. at 29l.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 292.
52. See id.; see also Haden Co. v. Comm'r, 118 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1941)
(holding that a debtor must include discharged debts in income to the
extent that the debtor became solvent as a result of the discharge because
the discharge is an accession to income in that year); cf Quinn v. Comm'r,
31 B.T.A. 142, 145 (1934) (holding that the cancellation of a mortgage
where the debtor remained insolvent did not result in taxable income because assets did not become available).
53. 42 B.T.A. 1110 (1940).
54. Id. at 1110.
55. Id. at 111O-1l.
56. Id. at 1113.
57. Id. at 1112-13. As authority for this holding, the Board of Tax Appeals cited
an old case decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court. See id. at 1113 (citing Underleak v. Scott, 134 N.W. 731 (Minn. 1912». In Under-leak, the
court considered whether a transfer of property by a debtor to his daughter
was a fraudulent conveyance under state law, which would avoid the conveyance under the Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898. 134 N.W. at 731-32. The
court held that whether a debtor was deemed "insolvent" under § 1 of the
Bankruptcy Act should be decided according to state law, and disposed of
the case on the basis that exempt property of the debtor should not be
considered in determining solvency. See id. at 734.
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when determining insolvency under the judicial insolvency
exception. 58
The development of the judicial insolvency exception can be summarized with the following principles. A discharged debt is considered income to the debtor,59 but it is not taxed to the extent that the
debtor is insolvent after the discharge. 6o When determining insolvency, property protected under state law from creditors' claims is disregarded as an asset of the debtor. 61
These principles are illustrated by returning to the example in the
Introduction. 62 Remember that in the example, Paul has liabilities of
$250,000 and assets of $360,000. Assume that his assets include his
ownership interest in a house in Maryland and that the underlying
fair market value of the (entire) property is $300,000. Paul owns this
house with his wife, Mary, as tenants by the entirety. A $100,000 debt
of Paul's (alone) is discharged. Under the judicial insolvency exception, Paul has $100,000 of income from the discharged debt. Whether
and to what extent that $100,000 is taxable income to Paul depends
on whether and to what extent he is insolvent, which is determined by
subtracting his liabilities from the fair market value of his assets.
Under the judicial insolvency exception, only $60,000 of his assets are
considered because the house he owns as a tenant by the entirety is
exempt under state law from claims of his creditors. 63 Therefore, Paul
is insolvent to the extent of $190,000-$250,000 of liabilities less
$60,000 of assets. Consequently, none of the $100,000 discharged
debt is includible in his income.
C.

Codification oj the Judicial Insolvency Exception in the Bankruptcy Tax
Act oj 1980

Congress largely codified the judicial insolvency exception in § 108
in the BTA 1980. 64 This legislation, which was part of bankruptcy law
58. See, e.g., Davis v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 814, 833-34 (1978) (disregarding the
value of a homestead exemption, an automobile, an insurance policy, clothing, and jewelry when determining insolvency because that property was
exempt from creditors' claims under state law); Hunt v. Comm'r, 57 T.C.M.
(CCH) 919,948 (1989) (disregarding the value of a homestead exemption
and certain personal property); Estate of Marcus v. Comm'r, 34 T.C.M.
(CCH) 39, 41 (1975) (disregarding life insurance policies); Babin v.
Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1357, 1366 (1992) (disregarding a checking account balance of less than $400, the cash value from a life insurance policy,
the value of an automobile, and apparel and household items to the extent
of $200 per item).
59. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
64. See Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 3389 (1980). Prior to its amendment
by the BTA 1980, the statutory exclusion of discharge of indebtedness was
limited to debt incurred in business. See S. REp. No. 96-1035 (1980), re-
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reform, set forth tax rules applicable to debts discharged in bankruptcy, as well as to insolvent debtors who do not go through bankruptcy proceedings. 65
Specifically, the BTA 1980 provided that if a debtor is insolvent, any
debt discharged is excluded from income to the extent of the debtor's
insolvency.66 But in order for the debt to be excluded, the debtor
must reduce his or her tax attributes in other property.67 When reducing tax attributes, a debtor may elect to reduce basis in depreciable property or in real property held as inventory; otherwise, he or she
must reduce net operating losses, certain tax credits, basis in other
property, and capital loss carryovers. 68 The legislative history of the
BTA 1980 makes clear that a primary purpose of § 108 is to ensure
that the discharged debt is eventually treated as ordinary income (and
therefore subject to tax). 69

65.

66.
67.
6S.

69.

printed in 19S0 U.S.C.CAN. 7017. Further, discharged debt was excluded
only to the extent that basis was reduced. See id. There are no similar limitations in the current discharge of indebtedness exclusion. See id. at 7035.
SeeS. REP. No. 96-1035, at 2,15 (19S0), reprinted in 19S0 U.S.C.CAN. 7017,
7030. Section lOS also excludes discharged debts that are qualified farm
indebtedness and qualified real property indebtedness. I.R.C.
§ 10S(a) (1)(C) & (D) (West 2004).
IRC. § lOS(a)(3); seeS. REp. No. 96-1035, at 2,15 (19S0), reprinted in 19S0
U.S.C.CAN. 7017, 7030.
I.R.C. § 10S(b)(1); seeS. REp. No. 96-1035, at 2,15 (19S0), reprinted in 19S0
U.S.C.CAN. 7017, 7017-1S, 7030.
I.R.C. § 10S(b) (2). A debtor may elect to first apply any portion of the
discharged debt to reduce basis in depreciable property. [d. at § 10S(b) (5).
If the debtor does not so elect, § lOS requires the debtor to reduce tax
attributes in the following order: (1) net operating losses, both in the year
of the discharge and any carryovers to that year; (2) carryovers to or from
the taxable year relating to general business credits under § 3S; (3) minimum tax credits under § 53(b) as of the beginning of the year immediately
following the discharge; (4) net capital losses under § 1212; (5) basis of
property of the taxpayer; (6) passive activity losses and credit carryovers
under § 469(b) in the year of the discharge; and (7) foreign tax credit carryovers under § 27. [d. at § 10S(b)(2). A debtor's reduction of basis in
property in number (5) applies to essentially all property the debtor owns,
including" [p] roperty not used in a trade or business nor held for investment." Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1 (a) (5) (2003). Presumably, the basis of property owned by the debtor and his spouse as tenants by the entirety does not
fall within this category because it is considered owned by a marital unit
and not by either spouse individually. Analysis of this issue is analogous to
the analysis of whether a tenancy by the entirety interest is an asset of the
debtor-spouse. Section lOS and the Treasury Regulation should be interpreted either to consider a debtor's tenancy by the entirety interest as an
asset in determining insolvency or to reduce the basis in a debtor's tenancy
by the entirety interest. The focus and conclusion of this article, however,
is that a tenancy by the entirety interest should be considered an asset of
the debtor-spouse. A discussion of ownership interests for basis reduction
is beyond the scope of this article.
S. REp. No. 96-1035, at 2-3, 10-11 (19S0), reprinted in 19S0 U.S.C.CAN.
7017, 701S, 7025-26; see also Info. Ltr. 2004-0125 (July 2S, 2004).
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CARLSON V. COMMISSIONER: EXEMPT ASSETS INCLUDED
IN INSOLVENCY DETERMINATION

More than twenty years after codification of the judicial insolvency
exception, the United States Tax Court (the successor to the Board of
Tax Appeals) heard Carlson v. Commissioncr. 70 In Carlson, the court
considered whether property protected under state law from creditors' claims should be disregarded when determining insolvency
under § 108, as it had been under the judicial insolvency exception. 71
Mter examining the plain language of § 108 and reviewing its legislative history, the court held that, unlike the judicial insolvency exception, property exempt under state law from creditors' claims was not
disregarded when determining insolvency under § 108. 72
The facts of Carlson are relatively simple. Roderick Carlson, a commercial fisherman, and his wife Jeanette purchased a fishing vessel
with funds borrowed from a bank.73 Later, the couple became delinquent in their loan payments and the bank foreclosed on the vesse1. 74
The bank reduced the balance of the loan with the foreclosure proceeds and discharged the remaining balance. 75 As a result, $42,142 of
the debt was discharged. 76 Mter concluding that their liabilities exceeded the fair market value of their assets, the debtors excluded this
amount from their taxable income pursuant to § 108. 77
Although the debtors had a commercial fishing permit, they excluded the permit as an asset when calculating their insolvency because it was exempt under state law from creditors' claims. 78 As a
result, the court had to determine whether assets that would have
been disregarded under the judicial insolvency exception were also
disregarded under § 108. 79
The court held that the word "assets," as used to determine insolvency under § 108, included property exempt under state law from
creditors' claims. 80 Before reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that the word "assets" was not defined in § 108 or the regulations thereunder, and that its dictionary definition supported more
than one construction. 8! Consequently, the court determined that
the meaning of "assets" was ambiguous and required further delibera70. 116 T.e. 87 (2001).
71. [d. at 88.
72. [d. at 106.
73. [d. at 88-89.
74. [d. at 89.
75. [d.
76. [d.
77. [d. at 89-90.
78. [d. at 90, 92. The commercial fishing permit had a fair market value of
$393,400. [d. at 92.
79. [d. at 101.
80. [d. at 105.
81. See id. at 93-94.
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tion. 82 Mter reviewing the legislative history of the insolvency exception, the court concluded:
Congress did not intend to exclude assets exempt from the
claims of creditors under applicable State law from a taxpayer's assets for purposes of determining whether the taxpayer is insolvent within the meaning of section 10S(d) (3).
If Congress had intended to exclude such exempt assets
from a taxpayer's assets in determining whether the taxpayer
is insolvent for purposes of section lOS, Congress would have
so stated in section 10S(d) (3). It did not. 83
The court then looked at the couple's ability to pay tax on the discharged liability, recognizing that if the couple's total assets exceed
their liabilities, then the debtors have "the ability to pay an immediate
tax on income from discharged indebtedness."84 The court concluded that the fishing permit did enhance the debtors' ability to pay,
despite its protection under state law. 85 Therefore, the court held
that the fishing permit was an asset for purposes of determining insolvency under § 1OS. 86 Accordingly, under § lOS, property exempt
under state law from creditors' claims is not disregarded as an asset.
In defining assets based on the debtors' ability to pay-rather than
on what the debtors' creditor could seize-the court expanded the
scope of what is considered an asset. The definition makes sense because the court was determining the couples' tax rather than their
ability to repay the debt. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the creditor could seize the property. This conclusion finds support in at least
two legal principles: first, exclusions from taxable income are construed narrowly;87 second, the IRS is empowered with authority that
gives it greater rights than a typical unsecured creditor. 88
The holding of Carlson left open the question of what other types of
property, disregarded under the judicial insolvency exclusion, are
considered assets under § lOS. One type is property titled as tenants
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See id. at 93.
[d. at 104.
[d. at 105.
[d. at 104-05.
[d. at 105. The holding in Carlson is consistent with the latest position of
the IRS, which considers property exempt under state law from creditors'
claims as an asset for the purpose of determining insolvency. This position
is a sea-change from the Internal Revenue Service's earlier position, and is
based on the rationale that excluding exempt assets would allow economically solvent taxpayers (i.e. debtors whose total assets exceed their total liabilities) to avoid tax liability despite their ability to pay. See, e.g., Tech. Adv.
Mem. 1999-35-002 (Sept. 3, 1999) (revoking Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-30-005
(Mar. 29, 1991»; Priv. Ltr. Rul.1999-32-013 (Aug. 13, 1999) (revokingPriv.
Ltr. Rul. 91-25-010 (Mar. 19, 1991»; Field Service Advice 1999-32-019 (Aug.
13, 1999); Service Center Advice 1998-039 (Apr. 1, 1998).
87. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328 (1995).
88. See, e.g., Scholssberb v. Barney, 380 F.3d 174, 181 (4th Cir. 2004).
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by the entirety. A question exists as to whether a tenancy by the entirety interest enhances a taxpayer's ability to pay.
IV.

UNITED STATES V. CRAFF: A SPOUSE'S TENANCY BY THE
ENTIRE1Y INTEREST CONSTITUTES PROPER1Y OR A
RIGHT TO PROPER1Y

In most common law jurisdictions, creditors of one spouse cannot
seize property (or that debtor-spouse's present interest in the property) held as tenants by the entirety.89 In 2002, the Supreme Court
recognized an exception to this rule in United States v. Craft.90 While
Craft did not concern § 108, the Court's rationale is instructive in determining whether a tenancy by the entirety interest enhances a
debtor's ability to pay tax because of the Court's analysis of the various
property rights inherent in a tenancy by the entirety interest.
Don Craft failed to file income tax returns for eight years, and, as a
result, had $482,446 of unpaid income tax. 91 The IRS assessed this
amount and, after Mr. Craft failed to pay it, the IRS attached a lien on
"'all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to' him."92 When the lien attached, Mr. Craft and his wife
owned a parcel of real property in Michigan-a jurisdiction recognizing the traditional common law incidents of ownership-as tenants by
the entirety.93 Mter notice of the lien was filed, the Crafts executed a
quitclaim deed purporting to transfer Mr. Craft's interest in the property to his wife for one dollar. 94 One year later, Mrs. Craft attempted
to sell the property and the IRS agreed to release the lien if half of the
sale proceeds were held in escrow pending resolution of the issue. 95
Mrs. Craft then brought an action to quiet title to the sale proceeds. 96 This action eventually came before the Supreme Court. 97
The Supreme Court held that, although only one spouse owed the
tax, a federal tax lien could attach to that spouse's tenancy by the
entirety interest. 98 To reach this holding, the Court examined the
breadth of control either spouse had over the property and concluded
that they each held "property" or a "right to property" in their interests. 99 The Court examined the state law property rights afforded to
89. See infra Part V.A (discussing tenancy by the entirety ownership in a traditional common law jurisdiction).
90. 535 U.S. 274 (2002).
91. Id. at 276.
92. Id. at 275-76 (quoting I.R.C. § 6321 (West 2000)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 27fr77.
95. Id. at 277. The IRS never asked for more than half of the proceeds of the
property titled as tenancy by the entirety. Id.
96. Id. at 277-78.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 288.
99. Id. at 282-85.
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each spouse, describing each spouse's property rights using the common "bundle of sticks" idiom, whereby each "stick" represents a property right. IOO These rights include the right to use the entire property;
receive income produced by the property; and, in particular, exclude
others from the property-" 'one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.' ,,101
Although the Court acknowledged that neither spouse alone could
alienate or encumber the property, nor sever the tenancy without consent of the other spouse or dissolution of the marriage, the Court concluded that these limitations were insufficient to disregard a tenancy
by the entirety interest as property or a right to property.l02 With the
tenancy by the entirety interest, the rights of the debtor-spouse "went
beyond use, exclusion, and income."103 The Court stated that Mr.
Craft
also possessed the right to alienate (or otherwise encumber)
the property with the consent of ... his wife [the non-debtorspouse] .... It is true ... that he lacked the right to unilaterally alienate the property, a right that is often in the bundle of property rights . . . . There is no reason to believe,
however, that this one stick-the right of unilateral alienation-is essential to the category of "property."104
The Court looked beyond the aegis of a tenancy by the entirety
ownership to determine that each spouse had rights to property that,
while not unfettered, were not illusory. !Os The Court advanced a common-sense approach that the property belonged to someone. 106 Indeed, if rights in property titled as tenancy by the entirety held by Mr.
Craft, the debtor-spouse, do not constitute "property" or "rights to
property," then the property would belong to no one-Mrs. Craft, the
non-debtor-spouse, would have
no more interest in the property than her husband; if
neither of them had a property interest in the entireties
property, who did? This result not only seems absurd, but
would also allow spouses to shield their property from federal taxation by classifying it as entireties property, facilitating abuse of the federal tax system. 107
Finally, the Court recognized the necessity of an expansive reach to
collect federal taxes because collection of iederal taxes was para100. Id. at 278-79.
101. Id. at 282-83 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1979».
102. Id. at 288.
103. Id. at 283.
104. Id. at 283-84 (citations omitted).
105. See id.
106. See id. at 285.
107. Id.
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mount; a contrary holding could encourage collusion to avoid
taxes. 108
V.

TENANCY BY THE ENTIRElY INTERESTS UNDER TRADITIONAL COMMON LAW

This section first analyzes the rights of a spouse holding a tenancy
by the entirety interest. The discussion focuses on Maryland law; however, it applies to jurisdictions that also retain tenancy by the entirety
ownership in its traditional common law form. Then, in light of the
ownership of those interests, this section examines whether a tenancy
by the entirety interest is an asset of one spouse for purposes of § 108.

A.

Incidents oj Ownership ConJerred Under Maryland Law

In traditional common law jurisdictions such as Maryland, ownership of a tenancy by the entirety interest entitles each spouse to the
whole property (its entirety), but neither spouse owns the property
individually.109 One spouse may lease, dispose of, or encumber the
property only with the consent of the other spouse,110 or after the
tenancy has been severed by an absolute divorce or death of the other
spouseYI Upon the death of one spouse, the surviving spouse takes
the entire estate. 112 Each spouse generally has an equal right to income derived from the propertyY3 Finally, a judgment creditor of
one spouse may not attach a lien to the property during the joint lives
of the spousesY4

108. Id. The Supreme Court remanded the case for the lower courts to value
the tenancy by the entirety interest. It bears noting, however, that the IRS
did not attempt to recover more than half of the proceeds from the property. See id. at 289. On remand, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan entered a stipulated judgment for the IRS to
retain $50,293.94 of net sales proceeds from the property. Craft v. United
States, No. 93-CV-306 (W.D. Mich. July 28, 2003). This amount ended up
being about half of the net proceeds.
109. State v. One 1984 Toyota Truck, 311 Md. 171, 187, 533 A.2d 659, 666-67
(1987).
110. Id. at 187, 533 A.2d at 667; Arbesman v. Wilner, 298 Md. 282,290,468 A.2d
633,637 (1983).
111. One 1984 Toyota Truck, 311 Md. at 187, 533 A.2d at 667; Beall v. Beall, 291
Md. 224, 234, 434 A.2d 1015, 1021 (1981).
112. Beal~ 291 Md. at 234, 434 A.2d at 1021.
113. Parsons v. Comm'r, 43 T.C. 378, 402 (1964) (interpreting Maryland law);
Bour v. Comm'r, 23 T.C. 237, 240 (1954) (interpreting Maryland law).
114. See One 1984 Toyota Truck, 311 Md. at 187, 533 A.2d at 666-67; Arbesman, 298
Md. at 289, 468 A.2d at 636.
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Whether a Tenancy by the Entirety Interest Constitutes an Asset Under
§ 108

For purposes of § 108, insolvency is the excess of a debtor's liabilities over the fair market value of his or her assets. llS Looking at the
word "assets" without reference to fair market value, a tenancy by the
entirety interest should be considered an asset under Carlson and
Craft. In Carlson, the Tax Court ended the long-standing practice of
disregarding property protected under state law from creditors'
claimsY6 This holding opened the door to consider that kind of
property as an asset when determining insolvency.
The court in Carlson based its query on what types of property increase a debtor's ability to pay the debt. 117 Property owned by both
spouses, regardless of how it is titled, increases their ability to pay
when both spouses are obligated-it is additional property from
which to derive income, to mortgage, and to sell. IIB
In states retaining the common law incidents of ownership of tenancy by the entirety property, the Supreme Court has held that each
spouse has property or rights to property.119 The Court reached this
holding based on each spouse's right to use the property, exclude
115. I.R.C. § 108( d) (3) (West 2004).
116. See supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
118. The tenancy by the entirety conundrum arises only when the debt is owed
by one spouse (alone), regardless of whether the spouses filed a joint return. When a husband and wife file ajoint return, their tax is computed on
the aggregate income of the couple; they are both jointly and severally liable for the collection of tax. See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (West 2004); Treas.
Reg. § 1.6013-4(b) (2002). Filing ajoint return does not create a new tax
personality-assets and liabilities owned by the individual spouses are not
combined to become assets of the marital unit. Cj Coever v. Comm'r, 36
T.e. 252, 254 (1961) (disregarding the idea that a new tax personality is
created when spouses file jointly).
Insolvency under § 108 is determined by reference to the extent to
which the debtor's assets are freed as a result of the discharge. See Carlson
v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 87, 98-99 (2001); Merkel v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 463, 47375 & n.7 (1997); cj United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1,3 (1931).
To determine whether assets are freed, a debtor's ability to pay must be
enhanced as a result of the discharged debt. Had the debt discharged been
jointly owned by the spouses, no assets jointly owned would be protected
under state law from creditors' claims, as it is generally accepted that a
judgment lien can attach to tenancy by the entirety property if both spouses
owe the debt. The IRS reached a similar conclusion in a Private Letter
Ruling in which it concluded that when determining whether a debtorspouse was insolvent under § 108, the separate property of the non-debtorspouse was not an asset when determining his insolvency because his
spouse's assets were her own, even if they filed ajoint tax return. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 89-20-019 (May 19, 1989).
119. See supra Parts IV and V.A (discussing tenancy by the entirety property),
Part IV (discussing Craft).
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others from the property, dispose of the property, and encumber the
property (with consent of the other spouse).120
At a minimum, the survivorship interest of each spouse enhances
that spouse's ability to pay.121 As a practical matter, the other incidents of ownership (i.e., exclusion, alienation, and encumbrance)
also enhance a spouse's ability to pay. This is because, in most circumstances, spouses act in concert to advance what is in their best interest.
Joint action with regard to tenancy by the entirety property is one way
to advance that interest: spouses can encumber their combined interest, sell their combined interest, or both, or refuse to do either. The
Supreme Court has recognized that the inability of one spouse to unilaterally encumber property is not a significant restriction on the
property that would undermine each spouse's other rights. 122 Therefore, the incidents of ownership in a tenancy by the entirety interest
enhance one spouse's ability to pay.
This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court's analysis in
Craft.123 Acting with the other spouse, the debtor-spouse may encumber or sell the property, or both.124 Selling and/or encumbering the
property gives a debtor more resources to repay the debt. Failing to
recognize this increased ability to pay would allow spouses to shield
their property from federal taxation, something the Supreme Court
recognized would facilitate abuse of the federal tax system. 125 Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized that the requirement of joint
spousal action regarding a tenancy by the entirety interest is an inconsequential limitation. 126
For purposes of the § 108 exclusion, insolvency is the extent that
liabilities exceed the fair market value of a debtor's assets. 127 If "assets" refers only to those with a fair market value, then a tenancy by
the entirety interest can never be an asset because there is no market
for the interest-only a spouse can hold a tenancy by the entirety interest with the other spouse-therefore, there can be no fair market
value. 128
This syllogistic reasoning unduly focuses on the form of the property interest, not the substantive right created thereunder, and ignores the Supreme Court's analysis of a tenancy by the entirety
120. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text (discussing the rights of a
tenant by the entirety as set forth in Craft).
121. Cf In re Ryan, 282 B.R 742, 748 (Bankr. D.R.1. 2002). One spouse's survivorship interest is generally recognized as an alienable interest with a value,
albeit speculative. Id.
122. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes103-04 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
127. I.R.C. § 108( d) (3) (West 2004).
128. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 281 (2002).
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interest in relation to the collection of federal income tax. I29 Further,
this argument fails to recognize that there is a market for the underlying property, and for either spouse's contingent survivorship interest. I30 Also, failure to acknowledge that spouses, by acting in their
best interest, can either shield assets from creditors or make them
available to sell or to encumber ignores the economic reality of the
property rights-and the resulting availability to pay a debt-inherent
in tenancy by the entirety ownership.I31 Finally, as discussed more
fully in the following sections, even looking at the definition of assets
only as those having an actual fair market value, tenancy by the entirety interests-both the present and future survivorship interestsshould be deemed to have a fair market value based on how they are
valued for other purposes of the Code, by courts, and by the IRS. I32
Where exclusion of a tenancy by the entirety interest would increase
the tax benefit being conferred (as with the § 108 insolvency exclusion), the tenancy by the entirety interest should be considered as an
asset. Ownership of a tenancy by the entirety interest does increase a
debtor's ability to pay tax-despite its strictures, it is a bona fide property interest. Moreover, consideration of a tenancy by the entirety interest is consistent with the judicial maxim that exclusions from
income are to be narrowly construed. I33 Failure to consider the interest would reduce the taxpayer's solvency, resulting in the exclusion
from taxation of a greater portion of the discharged debt. I34
Because a debtor-spouse owns the underlying property as a party to
a marriage, the value of his or her tenancy by the entirety interest
should be limited. Any valuation of the interest should give appropriate consideration to the non-debtor-spouse's interest, as well as contemplate factors that otherwise affect the value of either spouse's
interest, such as the impact of divorce and death.

129.
130.
131.
132.

See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 139-66 and accompanying text (discussing how courts value a
tenancy by the entirety interest in bankruptcy proceedings); notes 177-84
and accompanying text (discussing how courts consider a tenancy by the
entirety interest in a marital dissolution proceeding); notes 172-76 and accompanying text (discussing how a tenancy by the entirety interest is considered for estate tax purposes); notes 167-71 and accompanying text
(discussing how the IRS values a tenancy by the entirety interest in
collections) .
133. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
134. See United States v. Centennial Sav. Bank, 499 U.S. 573, 582 (1991).
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VI.

FAIR MARKET VALUE OF TENANCY BY THE ENTIRE1Y INTEREST TO DETERMINE INSOLVENCY

A.

Fair Market Value oj Debtor's Interest in Tenancy by the Entirety Property

Insolvency is calculated by subtracting a debtor's liabilities from the
fair market value of his or her assets. 135 Fair market value is the price
that a hypothetical willing buyer would pay, and a hypothetical willing
seller would receive, for property.136 For this purpose, the property is
valued at its highest and best use and without regard to events occurring subsequent to the valuation date, to the extent that those subsequent events were not reasonably foreseeable. 137 Determining fair
market value requires a factual inquiry, whereby all relevant evidence
is weighed and appropriate inferences are drawn. 138
B.

Application oJCraft to Determine the Value oj a Tenancy by the Entirety
Interest

In several recent bankruptcy proceedings, courts have answered
Craft's unanswered question: How should a spouse's tenancy by the
entirety interest be valued? All courts deciding the issue have considered the incidents of ownership associated with the interest in the applicable jurisdiction. Depending on the purpose of the valuation (i.e.,
replacement value versus another value), courts are split regarding
whether the value of one spouse's interest in tenancy by the entirety
property should be adjusted further to account for each spouse's separate survivorship interest in cases concerning a debtor's federal tax
obligation.
For example, in Popky v. United States,139 a federal district court in
Pennsylvania held that a debtor-spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest under Pennsylvania law was half the value of the underlying property.l40 In that case, the IRS assessed $42,799.20 of unpaid
employment taxes owed by the debtor-spouse, Sheila Popky.141 Four
years later, Mrs. Popky and her husband sold the property-titled as
tenants by the entirety-that was subject to an IRS lien. 142 After the
title company sent the IRS a check for $42,324.43, the Popkys initiated
a suit to quiet title to proceeds from the sale of property.143
The first issue the court decided was whether, under Pennsylvania
law, the tenancy by the entirety property held by Dr. and Mrs. Popky
135. I.R.C. § 108 ( d) (3) (West 2004).
136. See Kolom v. Comm'r, 454 U.S. 1011, 1013 (1981); Bank One Corp. v.
Comm'r, 120 T.e. 174,306 (2003).
137. Bank One Corp., 120 T.C. at 306.
138. Id.
139. 326 F. Supp. 2d 594 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
140. Id. at 603.
141. Id. at 597.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 596.
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could be subject to a federal tax lien where the tax was owed by only
one spouse. 144 Mter holding that the lien could attach to Mrs.
Popky's tenancy by the entirety interest, the court assigned a value to
the interest. 145 At the onset, the court recognized that under Pennsylvania law, while the Popkys were married, neither Mrs. Popky nor
Dr. Popky could destroy the tenancy or alienate any portion of it without the consent of the other. 146 On one hand, the court recognized
that equal division of the entireties property "fails to account for the
differing life expectancies of the spouses and ... the probability that
either spouse will ultimately have a right to the whole."147 On the
other hand, the court also recognized that consideration of the survivorship interests of the spouses relies
on a speculative prediction that both spouses will have an
average life span and it neither accounts for the health of the
spouses nor for the likelihood of divorce or a sale of the
property with the consent of both spouses which could break
up the tenancy by the entireties. To include these factors
would make valuation infinitely more complicated and
would again reach a valuation based merely on
speculation. 148
The court held that the "only equitable solution" was to value Mrs.
Popky's tenancy by the entirety interest at half the net value of the
underlying asset. 149
Similarly, in In re Gallivan,150 a federal bankruptcy court determined the value of each spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest for
purposes of a secured claim by the IRS against one spouse. 151 The
debtors were husband and wife, Jerry and Jeanette Gallivan, who filed
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. 152 Prior to the filing, Mr. Gallivan
was the sole proprietor of a trucking company that failed to pay employment tax. 153 The IRS filed pre-petition notices of tax liens and a
proof of claim (with both secured and unsecured components) regarding Mr. Gallivan's employment tax. 154
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

[d. at 597.
at 601,603.
at 601.
at 602-03.
at 603.
[d. The court's decision in Popky was based in part on a Pennsylvania statute that provides that if tenancy by the entirety property is not otherwise
divided by court order in a marital dissolution proceeding, then, upon divorce, each spouse holds half of the interest as tenant in common with the
other spouse. [d. at 600 (citing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3507(a) (West
2001) ).
150. 312 B.R. 662, 664 (Bankr. w.n. Mo. 2004).
151. [d.
152. [d.
153. Id.
154. [d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
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The Gallivans argued that the amount of Mr. Gallivan's tenancy by
the entirety interest, and therefore the amount of the IRS's claim,
should be reduced based on Mr. Gallivan's life expectancy.I55 The
IRS countered that the value of Mr. Gallivan's tenancy by the entirety
interest should be half the net value of the underlying asset. 156
The court rejected the debtor's argument that the value of each
spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest should be adjusted to account
for the life expectancies of the spouses, presumably to follow the
trend of other courts, stating that survivorship principles were not "entirely applicable in the bankruptcy context" because the extent of the
IRS's lien must be determined before a bankruptcy plan of reorganization could be confirmed. 157 Once confirmed, the IRS's lien would
not be increased if Mrs. Gallivan were to later predecease Mr. Gallivan. 158 The court held that an equal division of the interests seemed
equitable; it paralleled the distribution of the property after an entireties estate is severed due to a sale, divorce, or some other reason. 159
Further, the court concluded that the spouses have a "unity of interest, unity of entirety, unity of time, and unity of possession;" therefore,
they must each hold an equal interest. 160
While the foregoing cases have held that a debtor-spouse's tenancy
by the entirety interest is half the net value of the underlying property,
courts considering the replacement value, and not the fair market value,
of the property have held differently.161 For example, the District
Court for the Middle District of Florida held that the replacement
value of a debtor-spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest should reflect his life expectancy, citing federal estate tax regulations that value
life estates using actuarial tables. 162 The court held that "[d]espite its
administrative inconvenience, ... the value of a debtor's interest in
tenancy by the entireties property must be determined by joint life
actuarial tables" although using actuarial tables "invites speculation
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 665-66 (citing In reGarner, 952 F.2d 232, 236 (8th Cir. 1991); Popkyv.
United States, 326 F. Supp. 2d 594 (E.D. Pa. 2004».
158. In re Gallivan, 312 B.R. at 665.
159. Id. (citing Popky, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 602). The court's statement that equal
division of interests parallels the distribution of tenancy by the entirety interest after divorce may be inaccurate. As support for this statement, the
court in Gallivan relies in part in Popky. See supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text. Although the court in Popky did state that a tenancy by the entirety state is divided equally between spouses upon divorce, the court was
relying on a specific Pennsylvania statute. See supra note 149.
160. Id.
161. Replacement value is "the price a willing buyer in the debtor's trade, business,
or situation would pay a willing seller to obtain property of like age and
condition." Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 959 n.2
(1997) (emphasis added).
162. In re Murray, 318 B.R. 211, 214 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004).
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about the future and is administratively less convenient" than valuing
the debtor-spouse's interest at half the underlying asset value. 163
In another case, In re Basher,164 the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also held that the replacement
value of a debtor-spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest was affected
by each spouse's respective life expectancies because their rights of
survivorship altered their otherwise equal interests. 165 While these
courts' analyses are informative, they should not control in determining the value of property for purposes of insolvency because the value
of assets for insolvency is determined by reference to fair market
value, which may differ from replacement value. 166
C.

Value Used In IRS Collection Proceedings

The IRS considers the purpose for the valuation when determining
the value of the underlying asset. For purposes of imposing a federal
tax lien, as well as valuing a secured claim in bankruptcy, the IRS
deems a debtor-spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest to be half of
the net equity in the underlying property. 167 Similarly, in private foreclosure actions, the IRS deems a debtor-spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest to be half of the difference between the value of the
property and the amount of the senior lien. 168
In evaluating an offer in compromise for doubt as to collectibility
under § 7122, the IRS generally values a debtor-spouse's tenancy by
the entirety interest at half of the net equity in the underlying property.169 However, the IRS has routinely recognized that it can be as
low as twenty percent if the non-debtor-spouse paid substantially all of
the purchase price or mortgage payments, or if the non-debtor-spouse
163. [d.
164. 291 B.R. 357 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003).
165. [d. at 362, 364, 366. In Pletz v. United States, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
decision by a bankruptcy court, in which the bankruptcy court consulted
actuarial tables to value one spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest. 221
F.3d 1114,1118-19 (9th Cir. 2000). It is important to note that in Pletz, the
underlying property being valued was situated in Oregon, where under
state law, creditors of one spouse can attach that spouse's interest. [d. at
1117.
166. See, e.g., McGuire v. Comm'r, 44 T.C. 801, 806 (1965) (noting the taxpayers'
concession that replacement value may exceed fair market value); Underwood v. Comm'r, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 731 (1989) (recognizing that replacement value can enhance the fair market value of a used asset); Livingston v.
Comm'r, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 277 (1966) (recognizing that replacement value
is not a reliable indicator of fair market value but is worthy of consideration
for a new building); Himes v. Comm'r, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 515 (1949) (recognizing that the cost to replace a machine is not the proper basis for determining fair market value).
167. I.R.S. Notice 2003-60, 2003-2 C.B. 643.
168. [d.
169. I.R.M. 5.8.5.3.11(4) (Nov. 1,2000).
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refuses to commit the property for sale or for collateral on a loan to
help pay the offer. 170
While the IRS's valuation of a tenancy by the entirety interest in
bankruptcy proceedings and administrative settlements is not dispositive in determining valuation under § 108, it is instructive because the
IRS will always be a party to litigation resulting from an incorrect insolvency determination. Therefore, a debtor can make a tenable argument that a valuation approach different from these may be
contrary to the IRS's published guidance and prior litigating
positions. 171
D.

Value of One Spouse's Tenancy by Entirety Interest for Estate Tax
Purposes

In at least one instance, the Code expressly prescribes that the fair
market value of one spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest is half of
the underlying property's value. In § 2040(b), an estate tax provision,
half the value of property owned as tenancy by the entirety by a decedent and his or her spouse is included in the decedent's gross estate. 172 This valuation rule was intended to facilitate administration of
the estate, and it applies regardless of which spouse paid the consideration for the property.173
The express language in § 2040 (b) both favors and disfavors valuing a tenancy by the entirety interest as half the underlying property's
net value for purposes of § 108. On one hand, the statutorily prescribed valuation method supports the conclusion that halving the underlying property's net value is a reasonable method of determining a
fair market value for the interest. 174 On the other hand, the express
provision in § 2040(b), compared to the absence of similar language
in § 108, supports the conclusion that Congress intentionally omitted
the valuation method from § 108. 175 Further, valuation is inherently
170. Id. The IRS revised this provision of the Internal Revenue Manual on November 15, 2004 to eliminate the twenty-percent valuation. LRM.
5.8.5.3.11(4) (Nov. 15, 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/
ch08s05.html. The IRS generally does not consider assets of the nondebtor-spouse in determining whether an offer is adequate unless applicable state law permits the non-liable spouse's assets to be collected. Treas.
Reg. § 301. 7122-1 (c)(2) (ii)(A) (2002). Even if state law allows collection,
the assets are considered only to the extent that collection of those assets
would not materially and adversely affect the family's standard of living. Id.
at § 301.7122-1 (c)(2) (ii)(B).
171. C! Rauenhorst v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 157, 170-72 (2002) (rejecting arguments advanced by the IRS that contradict its published rulings of general
application that have not been modified or withdrawn).
172. LRC. § 2040(b) (West 2004).
173. Hahn v. Comm'r, 110 T.C. 140 (1998) (citing H.R Rep. No. 97-201, at 160
(1981); S. Rep. No. 97-144, at 126-27 (1981)).
174. 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 53:03
(6th ed. 2000).
175. See id. § 51:02.
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factual and should only be uniform where the facts dictate. Moreover,
analogous but unrelated legislation is often an unreliable means of
discerning legislative intent. 176 Therefore, the use of § 2040 (b) to
value a tenancy by the entirety interest for other purposes should only
occur when § 2040(b),s valuation method is endorsed expressly by
Congress.
E.

Treatment of Tenancy by the Entirety Interests in Marital Dissolution
Proceedings

In marital dissolution proceedings in common law jurisdictions,
property is distributed either equitably or equally.I77 For example,
Maryland is an equitable distribution state, which means that in marital dissolution proceedings, a court has discretion to award or apportion marital property between spouses as it deems equitable, just, and
reasonable-but not necessarily equally.178 Marital property includes
property titled as tenants by the entirety.179 When awarding marital
property, a Maryland court cannot transfer ownership between
spouses; it may only make an adjustment in the form of a monetary
award. I80 The amount of the monetary award is based on the following statutorily prescribed factors:
(1) the contributions, monetary and non-monetary, of each
party to the well-being of the family;
(2) the value of all property interests of each party;
176. Id. § 53:05.
177. See Equal Versus Equitable: The Issue of Equal Division, 15 No.3 EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION J. 25 (1998). In equal distribution states (e.g., New Hampshire), there is a strong presumption in favor of equal distributions of marital property. Id. at 26-28. In equitable distribution states (e.g., Hawaii,
Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New York, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming), there is no presumption favoring equal distribution. Id. at 27. In
hybrid-distribution states (e.g., Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Nevada, North
Carolina, Ohio, West Virginia, and Wisconsin), courts will begin with a presumption that marital property shall be divided in half, but then each
spouse's respective value should be adjusted if the equities dictate. Id. at
26-27.
178. Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 508-09, 629 A.2d 70, 76 (1993) ("In Maryland, as in the majority of equitable distribution states, 'equitable' does not
necessarily mean 'equaL"').
179. MD. CODE.~NN., FAM. LAw § 8-201 (e) (2004). If property is acquired before
a marriage but title is changed to tenancy by the entirety after the marriage,
the portion of the property paid for prior to the marriage is not marital
property. Kline v. Kline, 85 Md. App. 28, 40-41, 581 A.2d 1300, 1306
(1990).
180. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 8-202 (a) (3) (2004) ("[TJhe court may not
transfer the ownership of ... real property from one party to the other.");
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 8-205(a) (stating that "[aJfter the court determines which property is marital property, and the value of marital property,
the court may ... grant a monetary award ... as an adjustment of the
equities and rights of the parties concerning marital property, whether or
not alimony is awarded").
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(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time
the award is to be made;
(4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement
of the parties;
(5) the duration of the marriage;
(6) the age of each party;
(7) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(8) how and when specific marital property . . . was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property ... ;
(9) the contribution by either party of . . . [non-marital]
property to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety;
(10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision
that the court has made with respect to family use personal
property or the family home; and
(11) any other factor the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award. 18I

Each and all of the foregoing factors could affect the value of a
spouse's tenancy by the entirety interest in Maryland after an absolute
divorce, particularly the manner in which the tenancy by the entirety
property was acquired and the extent to which it was acquired with
non-marital property.
Mter applying these factors, a court could grant one spouse the entire value of the tenancy by the entirety property or none of it. 182
These factors are an express recognition by the Maryland General Assembly that courts are to look at all of the facts and circumstances
before assigning a value to each spouse's interest in the underlying
property. This valuation approach seems reasonable and, indeed necessary.183 Not only is each property unique,184 the contributions to
acquire and maintain property can vary greatly. Although there is no
market per se for a tenancy by the entirety interest, the multitude of
factors used by Maryland and other states to determine a fair market
value for the tenancy by the entirety interest in a divorce proceeding
181.
182.
183.
184.

MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 8-205(b).
See Alston, 331 Md. at 508, 629 A.2d at 76.
Id. at 506-07, 629 A.2d at 75.
The fact that land is unique is supported by the fact that specific performance, an equitable remedy, is preferred over an award of damages with regard to realty. See, e.g., Leet v. Totah, 329 Md. 645, 665, 620 A.2d 1372,
1381-82 (1993) (clarifYing that specific performance is an available remedy
for purchase of realty); Manning v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 230 Md. 415,
422, 187 A.2d 468, 472 (1963) (granting specific performance for realty);
Archway Motors Inc. v. Herman, 37 Md. App. 674, 682, 378 A.2d 702, 725
(1977) (recognizing that "specific performance is not only available but a
preferred remedy to a contract seller of land is firmly rooted in the law of
Maryland") .
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appears to replicate what a willing buyer and a willing seller would
consider in valuing property.

VII.

PROPOSED VALUATION OF A TENANCY BY THE ENTIRE1Y
INTEREST UNDER MARYLAND lAW

Since United States v. Craft, federal courts have generally valued a
tenancy by the entirety interest for purposes of a federal tax lien at
half the net value of the underlying property.185 These courts use half
the value because the lien immediately encumbers the debtorspouse's interest, which eliminates speculation regarding the effect of
death or a possible divorce. 186 Beginning the valuation at half the net
value of the underlying property is also consistent with the general
approach of the IRS. 187
This approach offers simplicity in a tax system based on self-assessment, whereby taxpayers are responsible for initially reporting their
taxes. This simplicity is particularly important where property laws of
each state could afford different rights and impose different restrictions on tenancy by the entirety ownership, and where tax parity between common law and community property jurisdictions is a goal.
This starting point is also consistent with, but not motivated by, the
valuation approach in § 2040 (b).
From this point, one spouse's interest should be adjusted based on
equitable distribution factors enumerated under state law in marital
dissolution proceedings, in which the tenancy is severed and each
spouse's interest is valued. The adjustment results because Maryland
(and many other states) has specifically recognized that each spouse's
interest in marital property, including tenancy by the entirety interests, may not necessarily be equal. 188 As explained above, if one
spouse demonstrates an overwhelming existence of any of the monetary award factors, then a Maryland court is likely to give that spouse
an award that represents a much greater, if not entire, interest in the
property.189 The reverse is also true: if the other spouse can demonstrate the overwhelming existence of any of the factors, then the other
spouse's award should be greater. Therefore, it should follow that if a
debtor-spouse can demonstrate the non-debtor-spouse's hypothetical
award would be greater, then the debtor-spouse's value in the tenancy
by the entirety interest should be reduced for purposes of determining insolvency under § 108. Consideration of these factors is consistent with the IRS's willingness to adjust valuation of a tenancy by the
entirety interest (in some cases calculating the value as low as twenty
percent of the net value of the underlying property) when consider185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See supra notes 141-61 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 148 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
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ing offers in compromise. 190 In applying this approach, it is critical
that the debtor-spouse remember that he or she bears the burden of
proof to establish valuation, and therefore the factors to support the
valuation, regardless of judicial forum. 191
Under state property law, each spouse's survivorship interest is the
only consistent difference between the tenancy by the entirety interests held by each spouse that may cause a significant difference in the
value of the interest between spouses. If a debtor-spouse can demonstrate an appreciable difference in life expectancies that would affect
the value of his or her survivorship interest, then that difference
should also be considered. As in most bankruptcy cases addressing
the issue, routine consideration of life expectancies would make valuation more complicated and based largely on speculation, particularly
because in the average case, any difference in value attributable to life
expectancies is likely negligible. 192 Therefore, this factor should affect the valuation only when, based on the facts and circumstances,
there is an appreciable difference in life expectancies that may yield
an appreciable difference in the valuation.
Applying this approach to our example,193 if Paul provided all of
the funds for the house he owns with Mary (and that can be proven),
the entire value of the underlying property should be considered as
an asset when determining whether he is insolvent. Therefore, his
assets of $360,000 would exceed his liabilities of $250,000 by $110,000,
which means that he would be solvent and the $100,000 of discharged
debt would be includible in his gross income. If, however, Paul could
demonstrate that the house was purchased entirely with Mary's separate, non-marital funds (for example, with money devised only to
her), then none of the value of the house should be considered his
asset because, were they to get a divorce, he ,,'ould likely not receive
any interest in the property. Thus, Paul would be insolvent to the
extent of $190,000, the amount that his liabilities of $250,000 exceed
the fair market value of his assets of $60,000. Similarly, if Paul were
much older than Mary, then a court may reduce the value of his tenancy by the entirety interest to account for his small survivorship
interest.

190. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7491 (West 2004) (imposing the initial burden on the taxpayer to introduce credible evidence in court proceedings arising in connection with examinations by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue);
United States v.Janus, 428 U.S. 433, 440 (1976) ("In a refund suit the taxpayer bears the burden of proving the amount he is entitled to recover.");
Higbee v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 438, 440-41 (2001) (recognizing the burden of
proof is on the taxpayer in a deficiency case); see also TAX CT. R. 142.
192. See supra notes 147-49, 157-59 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Based on the precedent of the Supreme Court and the United
States Tax Court, a tenancy by the entirety interest in a traditional
common law jurisdiction, such as Maryland, should be considered an
asset for purposes of determining the insolvency of one spouse under
§ 108. Consistent with the Tax Court's opinion in Carlson v. Commissioner, courts should look behind the veil of tenancy by the entirety
ownership to determine whether property affords the debtor-spouse
an enhanced ability to pay.194 Based on the rationale of the Supreme
Court in Craft, along with the methods employed by other courts and
the IRS, valuation of a tenancy by the entirety interest should begin at
half the net value of the underlying property.l95 The value should
then be adjusted to reflect special circumstances, such as a de minimus
contribution by the debtor-spouse to the acquisition of the property
or an extraordinary difference in the spouses' life expectancies.
Throughout, the burden of proof to show these special circumstances
exist would be on the proponent, who is most likely the debtorspouse.

194. See supra Part III.
195. See supra Parts IV-VI.

